[security] Additional SSRF protections (#12595)

Tighten SSRF protections when fetching from external URLs

src/backend/InvenTree/InvenTree/helpers_model.py

@@ -1,5 +1,7 @@
 """Provides helper functions used throughout the InvenTree project that access the database."""
 
+import contextlib
+import contextvars
 import io
 import ipaddress
 import socket
@@ -85,6 +87,66 @@ def construct_absolute_url(*arg, base_url=None, request=None):
     return urljoin(base_url, relative_url)
 
 
+_ssrf_guard_active = contextvars.ContextVar('ssrf_guard_active', default=False)
+_real_getaddrinfo = socket.getaddrinfo
+
+
+def _is_unsafe_ip(host: str) -> bool:
+    """Return True if the given (already-resolved) address string is private/reserved."""
+    ip = ipaddress.ip_address(host)
+    return ip.is_private or ip.is_loopback or ip.is_link_local or ip.is_reserved
+
+
+def _guarded_getaddrinfo(host, *args, **kwargs):
+    """Drop-in replacement for socket.getaddrinfo which enforces SSRF checks while active.
+
+    DNS resolution is otherwise delegated to the OS resolver on every connection
+    attempt an HTTP client makes - including ones made well after an earlier,
+    now-discarded resolution was validated by `validate_url_no_ssrf()`. An attacker
+    controlling authoritative DNS for their own domain can answer a first ("check")
+    lookup with a public IP and a later ("use") lookup with a private/internal one
+    (DNS rebinding), bypassing a validation step that only inspects the first answer.
+
+    Patching this at the socket layer means the *actual* resolution used to open the
+    real connection - whichever call that turns out to be - is the one that gets
+    checked, so there is no window between "validated" and "connected" for the
+    answer to change. The guard is only enforced while `ssrf_safe_context()` is
+    active in the current context, so unrelated resolutions (e.g. other threads
+    talking to the database/cache) are never affected.
+    """
+    result = _real_getaddrinfo(host, *args, **kwargs)
+
+    if _ssrf_guard_active.get():
+        for _family, _type, _proto, _canonname, sockaddr in result:
+            if _is_unsafe_ip(sockaddr[0]):
+                raise socket.gaierror(
+                    f'Host {host!r} resolved to a private or reserved address'
+                )
+
+    return result
+
+
+socket.getaddrinfo = _guarded_getaddrinfo
+
+
+@contextlib.contextmanager
+def ssrf_safe_context():
+    """Enforce SSRF IP validation on every DNS resolution performed within this block.
+
+    Wrap any code which resolves a user/attacker-influenced hostname and then
+    connects to it (e.g. `requests.get()`, or a library like WeasyPrint doing its
+    own resolution internally) in this context manager so that the resolution
+    backing the *actual* connection is validated, not just an earlier, separate
+    lookup whose result is discarded. See `_guarded_getaddrinfo` for why this
+    closes the DNS-rebinding TOCTOU gap that a standalone pre-check cannot.
+    """
+    token = _ssrf_guard_active.set(True)
+    try:
+        yield
+    finally:
+        _ssrf_guard_active.reset(token)
+
+
 def validate_url_no_ssrf(url):
     """Validate that a URL does not point to a private/internal network address.
 
@@ -109,9 +171,7 @@ def validate_url_no_ssrf(url):
         raise ValueError(_('Invalid URL: hostname could not be resolved'))
 
     for _family, _type, _proto, _canonname, sockaddr in addrinfo:
-        ip = ipaddress.ip_address(sockaddr[0])
-
-        if ip.is_private or ip.is_loopback or ip.is_link_local or ip.is_reserved:
+        if _is_unsafe_ip(sockaddr[0]):
             raise ValueError(_('URL points to a private or reserved IP address'))
 
 
@@ -158,6 +218,10 @@ def download_image_from_url(
     headers = {'User-Agent': user_agent} if user_agent else None
 
     try:
+        # SSRF protection: guard every DNS resolution made while actually connecting
+        # (not just the pre-check above) so a hostname cannot pass validation with
+        # one IP and then be connected to via a different, private one (DNS rebinding).
+        with ssrf_safe_context():
             response = requests.get(
                 remote_url,
                 timeout=timeout,

src/backend/InvenTree/InvenTree/tests.py

@@ -776,6 +776,41 @@ class TestHelpers(TestCase):
             large_img, timeout=10, max_size=10 * 1024 * 1024
         )
 
+    def test_download_image_dns_rebind_blocked(self):
+        """A hostname that resolves safely for validation but privately for the real fetch must be blocked.
+
+        Regression test: `validate_url_no_ssrf()` used to resolve the hostname once,
+        validate that result, and then discard it - the actual `requests.get()` call
+        resolved the same hostname again independently. An attacker controlling DNS
+        for their own domain could answer the first ("check") lookup with a public IP
+        and every subsequent ("use") lookup with a private/internal one (DNS
+        rebinding), so the real connection went somewhere the validator never saw.
+        """
+        public_addrinfo = [(2, 1, 6, '', ('93.184.216.34', 0))]
+        private_addrinfo = [(2, 1, 6, '', ('127.0.0.1', 0))]
+
+        calls = {'n': 0}
+
+        def rebinding_getaddrinfo(host, *args, **kwargs):
+            calls['n'] += 1
+            return public_addrinfo if calls['n'] == 1 else private_addrinfo
+
+        with mock.patch.object(
+            InvenTree.helpers_model,
+            '_real_getaddrinfo',
+            side_effect=rebinding_getaddrinfo,
+        ):
+            # The pre-check sees the safe public IP and passes; the *actual*
+            # connection attempt made by requests.get() must be independently
+            # guarded and must fail once it resolves to the private IP.
+            with self.assertRaisesRegex(Exception, 'Connection error'):
+                InvenTree.helpers_model.download_image_from_url(
+                    'http://rebind.example.com/image.png'
+                )
+
+        # Both the validation-time and connection-time lookups must have happened.
+        self.assertEqual(calls['n'], 2)
+
     def test_model_mixin(self):
         """Test the getModelsWithMixin function."""
         from InvenTree.models import InvenTreeBarcodeMixin

src/backend/InvenTree/report/fetcher.py

@@ -22,7 +22,15 @@ class InvenTreeURLFetcher(URLFetcher):
         scheme = parsed.scheme.lower()
 
         if scheme in ('data', 'http', 'https'):
+            from InvenTree.helpers_model import ssrf_safe_context
+
             self._validate_http_url(url, parsed)
+
+            # SSRF protection: guard the DNS resolution WeasyPrint performs internally
+            # when it actually opens the connection, not just the pre-check above - a
+            # hostname could otherwise pass validation with one IP and then be
+            # connected to via a different, private one moments later (DNS rebinding).
+            with ssrf_safe_context():
                 return super().fetch(url, headers)
 
         if scheme == 'file':

src/backend/InvenTree/report/tests.py

@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
 """Unit testing for the various report models."""
 
 import os
+import socket
 import tempfile
 from io import StringIO
 from pathlib import Path
@@ -1077,6 +1078,49 @@ class URLFetcherTest(TestCase):
             self.fetcher.fetch('')
             self.fetcher.fetch('data:text/css;base64,abc123')
 
+    def test_dns_rebind_is_blocked_at_fetch_time(self):
+        """A hostname that resolves safely for validation but privately for the real fetch must be blocked.
+
+        Regression test: `validate_url_no_ssrf()` used to resolve the hostname once,
+        validate that result, and then discard it, so `InvenTreeURLFetcher.fetch()`
+        would delegate straight to WeasyPrint's own fetcher, which resolves the
+        hostname *again* independently. An attacker controlling DNS for their own
+        domain could answer the first ("check") lookup with a public IP and every
+        subsequent ("use") lookup with a private/internal one (DNS rebinding), so the
+        real request WeasyPrint made went somewhere the validator never saw.
+        """
+        set_global_setting('REPORT_FETCH_URLS', True, change_user=None)
+
+        public_addrinfo = [(2, 1, 6, '', ('93.184.216.34', 0))]
+        private_addrinfo = [(2, 1, 6, '', ('127.0.0.1', 0))]
+
+        calls = {'n': 0}
+
+        def rebinding_getaddrinfo(host, *args, **kwargs):
+            calls['n'] += 1
+            return public_addrinfo if calls['n'] == 1 else private_addrinfo
+
+        def fake_weasyprint_fetch(_self, url, headers=None):
+            # Simulate WeasyPrint's own fetch-time DNS resolution, performed
+            # independently of the validation InvenTreeURLFetcher already did.
+            socket.getaddrinfo('rebind.example.com', None)
+            return {'string': b'should never be reached'}
+
+        import InvenTree.helpers_model as helpers_model
+
+        with patch.object(
+            helpers_model, '_real_getaddrinfo', side_effect=rebinding_getaddrinfo
+        ):
+            with patch(
+                'weasyprint.urls.URLFetcher.fetch', side_effect=fake_weasyprint_fetch
+            ):
+                with self.assertRaises(socket.gaierror):
+                    self.fetcher.fetch('http://rebind.example.com/image.png')
+
+        # The validation-time lookup (safe) and the fetch-time lookup (private)
+        # must both have happened for this to be a meaningful regression test.
+        self.assertEqual(calls['n'], 2)
+
 
 class DefaultTemplateFileTest(TestCase):
     """Unit tests for building the default report and label template files."""